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Abstract 
Insofar as warfare ecology aims to examine all war-related conditions, belligerent occupations are a 
necessary stage in its broad taxonomy. Under international law, belligerent occupations are covered 
by a distinctive subset of jus in bello (humanitarian law), which is imprecise regarding ecological 
changes. This chapter examines the potential role of warfare ecology in studying belligerent 
occupations, highlighting the multiple, often indirect, means by which such occupations shape 
ecological processes. Particular attention is paid to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, 
due to its protracted duration, although also discussed are environmental effects associated with the 
US and UK occupation of Iraq. The onus on the occupying power, under international humanitarian 
law, to protect the conditions of life for civilians can plausibly be applied to the environmental 
resources of the resident population. It is argued that warfare ecology can make a significant 
contribution both to assessing the effects of occupations and, through the generation of policy 
advice, to promote conflict outcomes more sensitive towards ecological processes. 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The emergent field of warfare ecology is concerned with the application of environmental research 
to the full range of war-related conditions. As noted by Machlis and Hanson (2008: 729), an 
accurate taxonomy of warfare is essential to the development of this field of study, which indicates 
a need explicitly to incorporate military occupation. All occupations are covered by international 
humanitarian law, though ‘permissive’ occupations  have contested legal status depending on the 
presumed consent of the displaced sovereign authority and the civilian population within the 
territory controlled by external military forces. The subject matter of this chapter is restricted to 
belligerent occupations, which under Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, are defined as 
territory placed under the control of a hostile army (International Committee of the Red Cross 
2010): such occupations lack the consent of the civilian population and its recognized 
representatives. It should be noted that civilian authorities (domestic or external) may be 
responsible for governance in belligerent occupations, but only under the supervision of the 
occupying authority. 
 
Under international law, belligerent occupations come under a distinctive subset of jus in bello 
(humanitarian law), complementing the legal norms governing the conduct of hostilities (Dinstein 
2009: xi). These norms are drawn from customary international law, the Hague Regulations (1907), 
the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) and Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions 
(Protocol I). As humanitarian law has evolved, it has focused increasingly on minimizing the 
impact of the occupying power on civilian resources and infrastructure until such time as the 
occupation ceases and legitimate government is re-established. Indeed, the overriding principle of 
the international law of belligerent occupation is that the civilian population of an occupied territory 
must benefit from maximal safeguards feasible in the circumstances (Schmitt 2003; Dinstein 2009: 
286). It should be noted that the designation of a ‘belligerent occupation’ is often disputed by the 
state in military control, such as the Israeli position on East Jerusalem and Gaza, and Morocco’s 
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stance on the Western Sahara. In this chapter, authoritative weight will be accorded to declarations 
on belligerent occupation by relevant representative bodies of the international community, notably 
the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice and the High Contracting Parties to the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. 
 
After briefly outlining the relevant provisions on environment protection in international 
humanitarian law, this chapter surveys the environmental effects of belligerent occupations, 
highlighting the multiple, often indirect, means by which such occupations shape ecological 
processes. Particular attention is paid to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, due to its 
protracted duration (since November 1967 as dated by UN Security Council Resolution 242), 
although also discussed are the environmental effects associated with the occupation of Iraq 
(deemed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 to be under occupation from May 2003 until 
June 2004, when an Iraqi Interim Government replaced the Coalition Provisional Authority). It is 
argued that warfare ecology can make a significant contribution both to assessing the effects of 
occupations and, through the generation of policy advice, to reducing those consequences. 
 
 
2.0 Belligerent occupation and the environment 
 
Existing humanitarian law prohibits extreme and disproportionate damage to the environment by 
belligerents during armed interventions. Along with customary international law, the key treaties of 
relevance are the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, Protocol I and the Convention 
on the Prohibition of Military and Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977). 
However, it is only in recent years that environmental considerations have seriously been treated as 
a legitimate constraint on warfare, which can be attributed to the precedents created by UN Security 
Council Resolution 687 (1991) establishing Iraqi liability for environmental (and other) damage 
during the First Gulf War and also to Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (2002), which states that the intentional infliction of “widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment” is a war crime (see Bunker 2004). 
 
While belligerent occupation falls within the scope of international humanitarian law, the 
application of its provisions on environmental protection are more uncertain; for belligerent 
occupation typically features low levels of violent conflict, where the occupying power encounters 
at most sporadic resistance from those opposed to its control. Furthermore, the relevant legal regime 
for environmental protection covers in practice the routine exercise of authority by the occupying 
power in its efforts to secure stable governance. The environmental protection duties of 
humanitarian law are, under belligerent occupation, largely indirect. In its overriding responsibility 
to meet the needs of the civilian population, the occupying power is obliged to exercise 
guardianship of natural resources (Hague IV: Article 55) and not to undertake extensive destruction 
and appropriation of property (Fourth Geneva Convention: Article 147). In addition, Article 54(2) 
of Protocol I prohibits the destruction, removal and disablement of civilian objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population, including agricultural areas, drinking water installations and 
irrigation works. It should be noted that, according to UN General Assembly Resolution 305 
(1972), an occupied population retains permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources 
(Okowa 2009: 244-245). The onus on the occupying power, under international humanitarian law, 
not to make fundamental changes in the constitutional, social, economic and political order of an 
occupied territory (Roberts 2006) can therefore plausibly be applied to the environmental resources 
of the resident population. 
 
There remains debate amongst scholars as to the application of multilateral environmental 
agreements and customary international environmental norms to warfare. Given the growing body 
of international environmental law, its potential scope for influence on the practice of belligerent 
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occupation is substantial. The more restrictive interpretation is that the exceptional status of a 
belligerent occupation means that only humanitarian norms apply as the specific law (lex specialis) 
tailored to the situation: peacetime environmental norms are effectively suspended insofar as they 
clash with this jus in bello (see Bunker 2004: 204). Less restrictive positions counter that peacetime 
environmental treaties remain applicable (e.g. Schmitt 1997: 41). In this chapter, the latter 
perspective is adopted, which is consistent with the understanding in humanitarian law that 
belligerent occupations should make as much space as possible for the continuation of pre-
occupation norms of governance. This covers arguments that international human rights law 
continues to apply, as well as other international treaties applied in peacetime. It is argued here that 
the population under occupation continues to be covered by the core customary rule of international 
environmental law – that states do not cause harm to the environment of other states or areas 
beyond national control. This means, for example, that these populations are entitled not to suffer 
environmental injuries caused by the occupier and/or other states. 
 
 
3.0 Assessing the environmental effects of occupations 
 
Like other conflict-related conditions, the presence of a belligerent occupation often presents major 
practical obstacles to scientific efforts to determine impartially the environmental effects of 
hostilities. Even if an occupation is stable enough to qualify as ‘post-conflict’, there may be serious 
limitations in data availability and monitoring, while both the occupying power and political 
representatives of the occupied may have neither the willingness nor capacity to undertake 
environmental assessments. It is also the case that the Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) 
undertaken by the international community have tended to sideline environmental considerations, 
except insofar as they have obvious linkages to human health, livelihoods and security (UNEP 
2009: 5). As formulated by the UN Development Group and the World Bank, PCNAs are 
undertaken with the consent of the occupying power (following an invasion) or domestic authorities 
(following a civil war), and are oriented to short-term recovery needs and longer-term 
reconstruction needs. In the past decade there has been a provision within PCNAs to consider 
environment as a cross-cutting theme. A recent UNEP review of PCNAs conducted from 2000 to 
2006 – including reports on periods of belligerent occupation in Iraq and Georgia – identified a 
growing recognition of immediate environmental problems, though a neglect of longer-term 
environmental needs and effects (UNEP 2009). 
 
Outside the PCNA process, UNEP has developed arguably the most credible set of post-conflict 
environmental assessments (PCEAs) within the international community. Since 1999, it has 
conducted ten PCEAs, including in Kosovo (2001), Afghanistan (2003), Lebanon (2007) and the 
Gaza Strip (2009). The PCEA methodology encompasses background research, systematic 
sampling, fieldwork and laboratory analysis: in the interests of transparency and neutrality, the 
terms of reference and methodological protocols are shared with all relevant parties. When field 
assessments are not possible for political or security reasons, UNEP has also conducted Desk 
Studies on the Environment – notably in 2003 for the occupied Palestinian territory and Iraq.  
 
While a comprehensive survey of relevant UNEP environmental assessments is outside the scope of 
this chapter, their categorization of ecological effects will be followed now in highlighting 
particular trajectories of change associated with belligerent occupations in practice. This classifies 
consequences by: direct changes to natural resources and ecosystems – distinguishing here between 
(i) the effects of large-scale conflicts and (ii) the direct effects of occupation practices – (iii) indirect 
effects on natural resources and ecosystems, and (iv) reductions to institutional capacity for 
environmental management. While UNEP post-conflict assessments in practice have tended to 
focus on negative environmental consequences, there are occasions – some noted below – when 
military interventions have led to positive ecological consequences, whether or not these were 
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intended. These include removing regimes that have employed environmental pollution as a 
military tactic (e.g. the firing of oil wells and trenches by Iraqi forces in 2003). 
 
 
3.1 DIRECT CONFLICT EFFECTS ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECOSYSTEMS 
 
The most obvious source of war-related environmental damage within occupied territories is the 
legacy of large-scale military action either preceding an occupation (e.g. the Coalition attack on 
Iraq between March-May 2003) or taking place during an occupation (e.g. the Israeli attack on the 
Gaza Strip, code-named Operation Cast Lead, between December 2008-January 2009). At the same 
time, contemporary armed conflict may exacerbate pre-existing environmental vulnerabilities, 
posing longer-term risks to the populations of occupied territories. UNEP environmental 
assessments of armed conflict in Iraq (UNEP 2003b; 2003c) and the Gaza Strip (UNEP 2009a) 
listed the following problems as significant: 
 
3.1.1 Water and sanitation 
 
In Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s regime, poor maintenance of the water infrastructure and 
unsustainable irrigation practices were, prior to the 2003 conflict, already causing severe 
contamination of surface water and salinization of agricultural land. This was both the result of 
misrule and the effects of the international sanctions regime, which blocked imports of equipment 
and chemicals necessary for water infrastructure maintenance (Physicians for Human Rights 2003: 
3). The focus of US and UK attacks on major urban areas resulted in serious impacts on Iraqi water 
distribution and sanitation systems, in large part because of deliberate cuts to electricity supplies 
(UNEP 2003b: 71). While water supplies in major cities were restored by April 2003, water 
networks and pumping stations were subject to acts of sabotage during and after the Coalition 
occupation, impeding investments in sanitation and sewage systems. Without significant 
improvements in water infrastructure, the population continues to face a high risk of disease 
epidemics, as evident from the major cholera outbreak in 2008 (IRIN News 2008). In the Gaza 
Strip, severe water quality and sanitation problems accentuated by the Israeli blockade and 
economic sanctions (which were introduced after the election of the Hamas Government in January 
2006) were further stressed during Occupation Cast Lead by Israeli military damage to water wells, 
as well as to the water distribution and sewage network. For example, a direct hit to the 
embankment wall of the Az Zaitoun wastewater treatment plant led to a wastewater and sludge 
spillage affecting 55,000 square metres of agricultural land (UNEP 2009a: 33-36). 
 
3.1.2 Waste 
 
The Iraqi capacity for waste collection and disposal was eroded by the UN sanctions regime 
preceding the start of the US and UK attack in March 2003. While hampered in its Desk Study on 
the Environment by the lack of information on Iraqi waste management practices, UNEP concluded 
that accumulations of domestic, demolition and clinical waste were already posing significant risks 
to human health; and that previous military conflicts – including the 1991 Gulf War – had resulted 
in large and widespread quantities of military debris and toxic material (UNEP 2003b: 34-37). 
Impacts of the 2003 conflict was judged to have exacerbated the critical waste management 
situation in Iraq, aggravating health and safety risks to urban populations: the risks included disease 
vectors sourced to human remains, clinical and food waste, and exposure to hazardous dust and 
debris (UNEP 2003b: 71). More confidence is attached by UNEP to its assessment of waste 
problems in the Gaza Strip on account of the extensive access of its technical team to impacted 
areas in May 2009. Israeli military actions during Operation Cast Lead impacted almost 2,700 
buildings in the Strip, generating approximately 600,000 tonnes of debris (UNEP 2009a: 27). While 
the international community has funded the clean-up of this debris – including provision for 
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materials recovery and re-use – concerns remain about the insufficient capacity of local landfill 
sites and the absence of a dedicated facility for processing hazardous wastes. A lingering post-
conflict challenge is the presence in landfills of hazardous health care waste mixed with domestic 
wastes, which can be traced to the disruption of medical waste disposal systems during the Israeli 
bombardment (UNEP 2009a: 77). As in Iraq, the physical impacts of the conflict overloaded a solid 
waste infrastructure that was already weak and fragmented. 
 
3.1.3 Pollution from oil fires and spillages 
 
The UN sanctions regime that weakened solid waste management in Iraq also prevented proper 
maintenance of its oil infrastructure, and UNEP surmised that significant degradation of soil and 
groundwater, and flaring-induced air pollution, were likely to have been present before the invasion 
(UNEP 2003b: 38). During the immediate hostilities, Iraqi forces set fire to a number of oil wells 
(in southern Iraq) and oil-filled trenches (around Baghdad) to impede US/UK surveillance and 
weapons systems. In contrast to the substantial ecological damage caused by the firing of Kuwaiti 
oil wells by the retreating Iraqi army in 1991, UNEP observed a more localized diffusion of 
pollutants in 2003: indeed, given their potential contamination of soil and groundwater bodies, 
unfired oil trenches were assessed to more environmentally damaging over the long-term (UNEP 
2003b: 74-79). Fuel stations and tanks were systematically targeted by Israeli military forces in the 
2008/2009 Gaza Strip hostilities, although the UNEP post-conflict environmental assessment 
uncovered no evidence of major oil pollution incidents (UNEP 2009a: 30-31): here, the small-scale, 
dispersed nature of Gazan industrial facilities is likely to have reduced the risk of high-consequence 
oil pollution from military strikes. 
 
3.1.4 Physical degradation of ecosystems 
 
No military actions in the 2003 Iraqi conflict had ecological effects comparable in scale to the 
massive degradation of ecosystems unleashed by domestic policy choices in the preceding decade, 
notably the destruction of the Mesopotamian marshlands as a result of the construction of upstream 
dams and politically-motivated drainage schemes. UNEP’s Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq 
illustrates vividly the shrinkage of the southern wetlands, with dramatic losses in biodiversity 
(2003b: 39-44). Elsewhere in Iraq, over-exploitation of dryland ecosystems had increased the risk 
of desertification prior to the Coalition invasion. In terms of ecosystem damage during the 2003 
Iraqi war, UNEP estimated widespread degradation to desert environments from intensive military 
activities. The use of depleted uranium munitions by Coalition forces was also highlighted as giving 
rise to environmental and health risks, although with continuing uncertainties as to the long-term 
effects (UNEP 2003b: 80-82; UNEP 2003c: 20-21). 
 
For the Gaza Strip, Operation Cast Lead had major environmental effects on its already vulnerable 
farmland. In its 2009 environmental assessment, UNEP reports on the findings of a UNDP post-
conflict survey, which claimed that 17% of the total cultivated area of the Gaza Strip was seriously 
damaged, including 17.5% of the orchards and 9.2% of open fields. A long-term reduction in 
agricultural productivity is also forecast as a result of the extensive destruction of the vegetation 
cover, because of: (i) the mixing and degradation of the thin topsoil cover, (ii) the unavailability of 
heavy ploughing machinery to break up dense soil crusts caused by the tracks of Israeli military 
vehicles, (iii) increased sensitivity to soil erosion and desertification, and (iv) the intolerance of 
young fruit and olive saplings to the brackish water now routinely used for irrigation in the Gaza 
Strip (UNEP 2009a: 32). Furthermore, the rebuilding and restocking of destroyed greenhouses, 
livestock and poultry farms is severely constrained by Israeli and Egyptian restrictions on the 
movement of people and materials across their borders with the Gaza Strip. 
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3.2 DIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION PRACTICES 
 
Direct changes to natural resources and ecosystems may also be caused by occupation practices. 
Under Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, destruction and appropriation of civilian 
property is only justified by ‘military necessity’, which would cover, for example, the unavoidable 
degradation of water and agricultural resources as a result of the movement and deployment of 
military assets. Outside such direct consequences, the occupying power is bound by humanitarian 
law not to utilize natural resources for the purposes of its domestic population: should these 
resources be privately owned, there is a prohibition against confiscation (Hague Regulations, 
Article 46) and, if they are publicly owned, there is an obligation to administer them under the rules 
of usufruct; that is, a right of use that conserves the capital stock of the resources in question 
(Hague Regulations, Article 55). International environmental law reinforces the principle here that 
the occupying force should not create long-term environmental damage: Principle 21 of the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment enjoins states not to cause damage to the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
 
Since 1967 the enduring occupation by Israel of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the 
Gaza Strip provides much practical evidence on the environmental effects of the coercive control of 
a territory. Israel has always been resistant to the notion that the Fourth Geneva Convention is de 
jure applicable to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), though the Supreme Court of Israel has 
repeatedly ruled that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are areas subject to the application of law of 
belligerent occupation (Dinstein 2009: 23). Authoritative representatives of the international 
community, including the UN and the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
have also consistently maintained the international humanitarian law applies to the oPt. This 
includes the Gaza Strip even after the unilateral Israeli disengagement in September 2005, because, 
it is claimed, effective control is still exercised by Israel. Similarly, while annexed by Israel in 
1980, the international community continues to regard East Jerusalem as subject to occupation. The 
application of humanitarian law to the oPt raises critical issues about the environmental 
responsibilities and impacts of the occupying power and its citizens, including the 290,000 Israeli 
settlers who currently reside in the West Bank (in contravention of Article 49 of the Geneva 
Convention and Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). 
 
3.2.1 Water resources 
 
The oPt has low levels of per-capita water availability – three-quarters of the population are 
estimated to consume between 60-100 liters for domestic use per capita per day (lcpd) compared to 
330 lcpd in Israel (Zeitoun 2008: 14). In the West Bank, average water availability for Palestinians 
is lowest at 50 lcpd compared to 369 lcpd for Israeli settlers. In the Gaza Strip it is just over 90 lcpd, 
with very poor drinking water quality (World Bank 2009: 13, 28). This situation is of ongoing 
humanitarian concern as the WHO minimal standard for daily water consumption for direct human 
consumptive needs is 100 lcpd. According to recent reports by the World Bank (2009) and Amnesty 
International (2009), Palestinian water insecurity is largely the result of the occupation, as Israel 
effectively controls shared Israeli-Palestinian water resources. While joint governance rules and 
water allocations were established under the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement, these have failed to 
allow the development of a functioning water infrastructure for the Palestinians, entrenching instead 
a highly asymmetric access to water resources in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, the economic 
blockade has prevented necessary investments in water and sanitation, including local desalination 
capacity and the option of transferring water from the West Bank Mountain Aquifer: as a result the 
Coastal Aquifer is being severely degraded by over-extraction and pollution from sewage and 
irrigation (UNEP 2009b: 55-62). 
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The effects of the occupation on water resources are compounded by the Israeli ‘security fence’ or 
barrier complex constructed first along the border with Gaza in 1987 in response to the First 
Intifada, and then, since 2002, as a Separation Barrier from the West Bank (eventually to reach a 
planned 763km), running mostly within the Palestinian side of the Green Line and encompassing 
major Israeli settlements in occupied territory. For the Gaza Strip, this has meant the denial of entry 
to equipment and supplies necessary to repair water facilities following the recent conflict. In the 
West Bank, movement and access restrictions on the civilian population are having severe public 
health and environmental impacts. For the crucial Western Aquifer Basin, for example, which is the 
largest groundwater resource between the two territories, Israeli prohibition of new Palestinian 
wells, and restrictions to existing Palestinian wells caught on the Israeli side of the Separation 
Barrier, are significantly reducing supplies of agricultural water for the northern West Bank 
(Trottier 2007: 121). 
 
3.2.2 Agricultural resources 
 
As agriculture in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip accounts for two-thirds of Palestinian 
withdrawn water, water deficits induced by the Israeli occupation have significantly constrained the 
goals of the Palestinian Authority to develop this sector – one that accounts for 10% of Palestinian 
GDP and 15% of total employment. Coupled with declining water availability, access and 
movement restrictions have inhibited agricultural labor inputs and the export of agricultural goods 
(World Bank 2009: 25-26). In the West Bank, plans to increase the contribution of irrigated 
agriculture (currently only 6% of the cultivated area), which would be supportive of high value 
vegetable and fruit crops, have been held back by Israeli restrictions on well-drilling. Israeli 
government and settler activities are also a significant constraint on Palestinian agricultural 
activities; for example, the politically-motivated destruction of Palestinian olive trees by settlers, 
along with the clearance of agricultural land for the construction/expansion of settlements and their 
associated security infrastructure. Similarly, investment in the agricultural sector in the Gaza Strip 
has been frustrated by the Israeli closure regime imposed following the election into government of 
Hamas: farmers have substantially reduced the planting of export crops (e.g. cherry tomatoes, 
peppers, cucumbers) on account of the severe difficulties in moving them across the border. 
 
It should be noted that the agricultural sector is also a crucial underpinning of the food security of 
the Palestinian population, and here occupation practices have increased the vulnerabilities of 
households and communities. In 2008 25% of the West Bank population and 56% of the Gaza 
population were deemed by the Food and Agriculture Organization to be food insecure, resulting in 
major food aid interventions by international humanitarian agencies (FAO 2008). While recent 
droughts have affected food production (particularly for the rain-fed cultivated fields and 
rangelands of the West Bank), these climatic stresses have been accentuated by the security and 
settlement practices of the occupying power. To be sure, the attribution of agricultural sector 
impacts to particular occupation practices is often contested between the Israeli Government and the 
Palestinian Authority, and the institutional weaknesses of the latter are also a contributing factor to 
food insecurity. However, there is consensus amongst international organizations active in the oPt – 
 e.g. UNDP, FAO, World Food Programme – that the occupation is significantly impeding the 
development of the Palestinian agricultural sector. This includes indirect environmental effects 
from the coping strategies employed by local communities (see Section 3.3. below). 
 
3.2.3 Waste pollution 
 
In its Desk Study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, UNEP (2003a) noted 
with alarm the various environmental and health threats from waste pollution in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip caused by: (i) a lack of treatment facilities for wastewater resulting in pollution of the 
Mountain (West Bank) and Coastal (Gaza Strip) Aquifers, (ii) the open burning of municipal solid 
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waste and the mixing in landfill sites of hazardous and non-hazardous waste, and (iii) the lack of 
storage and disposal options for hazardous wastes. Inadequate management by Palestinian 
authorities was blamed for some of these environmental risks, but a number were directly linked to 
occupation practices. For wastewater pollution, it is notable that, since 1967, Israel has only 
established one sewage pre-treatment plant (at Tulkarem) for the Palestinian population in the West 
Bank, and has also blocked or delayed the upgrading of the three sewage treatment plants in Gaza. 
Even more obviously a consequence of occupation is the release of large quantities of poorly treated 
domestic and industrial sewage by most of the Israeli settlements and outposts in the West Bank: in 
addition, approximately 200,000 Israelis living beyond the Green Line in East Jerusalem produce 
substantial quantities of untreated or partially treated sewage that flows eastwards into the West 
Bank, causing environmental damage to soil and water resources (Amnesty International 2009: 69-
70). 
 
In 2003 UNEP judged Israeli environmental authorities to have limited control over an estimated 
131,000 tons of solid waste produced by the Israeli settlements in the West Bank (UNEP 2003a: 59-
68). Until Israeli National Master Plan 16 (1986) on solid waste treatment, hundreds of illegal waste 
dumps were scattered across Israel and the oPt. The subsequent decommissioning of dump sites 
only applied to Israel, and though military orders issued by the Israeli Civil Administration in the 
West Bank applied Israeli waste disposal standards to settlements, the Palestinian Authority has 
alleged that the unregulated disposal of untreated solid waste (including hazardous wastes) 
continues and that decommissioned sites have not been made safe (Tagar and Qumsieh 2006: 12-
13; Amnesty International 2009: 70). As with wastewater management, access and movement 
restrictions associated with the occupation have hampered solid waste management. In the West 
Bank, curfews and roadblocks, which increased in the wake of the Second Intifada, have disrupted 
the transfer of waste to municipal disposal sites, triggering the creation of unregulated, temporary 
disposal sites and the open burning of waste. For the Gaza Strip, the temporary storage and burning 
of waste intensified during and after Operation Cast Lead, while the shutting down of incinerators 
(due to electricity shortages) resulted in the indiscriminate dumping of hazardous wastes in landfill 
sites (UNEP 2003a: 58-70; UNEP 2009a: 44-54). 
 
3.2.4 Conservation of biodiversity 
 
The variety of physical environments within the oPt gives rise to rich land and marine biodiversity. 
While there is no systematic database of biodiversity in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the oPt 
shares threats to biodiversity with other territories in the Mediterranean biome – these include rising 
human population density, urbanization, agricultural land use and invasive species. However, the 
unique structures and practices of the occupation have negatively affected biodiversity. In the West 
Bank, the main negative effects have been caused by extensive settlement building, the construction 
of the Separation Barrier, and the associated growth of a parallel road infrastructure for the use of 
settlers and the military. Not only have these practices resulted in the loss and fragmentation of 
wildlife habitats, they have also eroded the rich agricultural biodiversity built up over centuries by 
Palestinian farmers, from crop varieties to domesticated bees (UNEP 2003a: 95-103). In the Gaza 
Strip, desertification processes in the southern agricultural lands have been accelerated by the 
imposition by the Israelis of a closed security area along the border, preventing farmers from 
gaining access to their lands. The Strip has one protected natural area. In 2002 the Palestinian 
Authority established the Wadi Gaza Nature Reserve on a salt marsh ecosystem that historically 
served as a major resting point for migratory birds: this site has been severely degraded by sewage-
related contamination, which at least in part is attributable to delays in installing a wastewater 
treatment plant as a result of the Israeli blockade on materials and investment into Gaza (UNEP 
2009a: 41-42, 50). 
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It should be noted that military interventions do not necessarily generate negative ecological 
consequences for biodiversity. There are historical examples of landscapes and ecosystems 
benefitting ecologically from exclusionary zones enforced by the military, such as the Korean and 
Cypriot demilitarized zones (e.g. Pearson et al. 2010). Similarly, recent efforts to restore the 
Mesopotamian marshes in Iraq indicate that military interventions and occupations may enable 
ecological restoration of previously degraded ecosystems (Stevens 2007). Nevertheless, in the 
Palestinian and Iraqi cases, the direct ecological effects of occupations have been judged by 
international organizations to be overwhelmingly negative on balance. 
 
 
3.3 INDIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION PRACTICES 
 
As with conflict more generally, occupation practices can indirectly affect natural resources and 
ecosystems by influencing (constraining or enhancing) the adaptive coping strategies employed by 
local populations and displaced people (UNEP 2009b: 6). These indirect environmental effects, 
mediated by the behavior of the occupied population, are multiple, and can be assessed according to 
different timeframes and scales, but generally they relate to the means by which affected 
communities respond to the material and social constraints imposed on them by an occupation. Of 
course, even assuming the occupying power complies with international humanitarian law, the 
coercive nature of belligerent occupation often entails significant restrictions on the livelihood 
options for affected civilians. Aside from the environmental consequences caused by military 
actions preceding or interrupting an occupation, the civilian population must also cope with, and 
adapt to, the stresses of occupation practices, such as movement restrictions, personal insecurity and 
disincentives to wealth creation.  
 
In Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (April 2003 to June 2004), the severe lack of 
security and stability aggravated humanitarian demands from a population already weakened by the 
conflict and the preceding UN sanctions regime. The collapse of the oil and agricultural sectors (the 
two largest sectors of employment), along with insurgent attacks in major urban areas, saw a 
dramatic reduction in livelihood opportunities (Sen 2003). As the scale of the humanitarian crisis in 
Iraq was not foreseen by the occupying powers, it overwhelmed their post-invasion governance 
capacity. The Iraqi population became heavily dependent on international aid, while natural 
resource use was plagued by corruption and illegal trade, notably in oil. It should be noted that the 
Coalition Provisional Authority did attempt to facilitate environmental benefits in some of the 
recovery and coping strategies it directed at the occupied population. For example, in October 2003, 
the US Government began a three-year agricultural reconstruction and development program: $343 
million was invested in activities that included soil conservation, improved water management and 
support for agricultural livelihoods (USAID 2009). Nevertheless, the great bulk of the $33 billion in 
grants and loans pledged by international donors in October 2004 did not address environmental 
issues (UN Development Group/World Bank 2006: 6). 
 
In a protracted belligerent occupation, as with the Israeli presence in Palestinian territory, there may 
be long-term damage to the capabilities and assets of the affected population (including refugees 
and internally displaced groups) resulting in negative environmental effects. Such damage is more 
likely to the extent that the protective rules of humanitarian law are not effectively implemented or 
enforced. There is strong prima facie evidence that this is the case in both the West Bank and Gaza. 
In the former area, Israel control of natural resources and movement restrictions on the Palestinian 
population have increased  environmental pressures; for example, rangeland degradation in the 
south Hebron hills caused by over-grazing, because Palestinians are denied access to traditional 
pastures and other livelihood opportunities. In the Gaza Strip, the Israel blockade has induced short-
term coping mechanisms with negative environmental and social effects; for example, the use of 
vegetable oils for fuel causing local air pollution, soil contamination as a result of the use of 
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untreated wastewater for agriculture, and increased water scarcity from unregulated well-digging 
(UNDP 2010). While Palestinian governance failings are apparent in both the West Bank and Gaza 
(see Section 3.4 below), the occupying power has major responsibility, both legally and practically. 
 
Climate hazards and other external environmental stresses can also affect the indirect environmental 
effects of occupation. In Iraq, post-conflict recovery of irrigated agriculture and the Mesopotamian 
marshlands has been threatened by three years of drought, as well as upstream damming of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers by Syria and Turkey. Benvenisti has argued that the law of occupation 
includes grounds for the occupying power to safeguard freshwater resources by negotiating with 
neighboring states (2003: 870-872), though the Coalition Provisional Authority made no such 
representations to Syria and Turkey. For Palestinians, climate change modeling predicts, over this 
century, a decrease in precipitation of up to 35% (with significant seasonal variation), a significant 
warming of between 2.60C and 4.80C, and a tendency towards more extreme weather events. The 
biophysical impacts forecast include an increased probability of flash floods, droughts, 
desertification and saline intrusion into groundwater (UNDP 2010: 49-56). According to UNDP, the 
Israeli occupation has significantly weakened the capacity of Palestinians to cope with, and adapt 
to, climate hazards, notably from restrictions imposed on the development of efficient water 
infrastructure, as well as the loss and degradation of agricultural land as a result of security and 
settlement practices (UNDP 2010). 
 
 
3.4 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
 
The conflict preceding or interrupting a belligerent occupation can disable or remove the domestic 
governance institutions within an affected territory. Even if not directly targeted, the collapse of 
environmental management institutions may lead to uncontrolled resource exploitation and 
pollution (UNEP 2009b: 6). In addition, the immediate priorities of the occupation government are 
likely to be the maintenance of the rule of law rather than environmental regulation. International 
humanitarian law nevertheless calls on the occupying power to pursue an ‘effective administration’ 
over the territory it controls, as explicitly noted in Security Council Resolution 1483 on Iraq 
(Benvenisti 2006: 863). This resolution obliged the US and UK to promote the welfare of the Iraqi 
people, which included their lawful right to proceeds from the exploitation of oil and natural gas 
resources. In the case of the occupied Palestinian territory, the unprecedented length of the Israeli 
occupation has raised far-reaching questions as to how the responsibility for environmental 
management should be allocated when there are different levels of control exercised over East 
Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including different categories of control within the 
West Bank, as well as the separate application of Israeli domestic law to the settlements). 
 
Given the complexity and costs of governing an occupied territory, it is not surprising that, subject 
to the oversight of the occupying power(s), domestic authorities may be allowed to perform 
governmental functions (Schmitt 2003). In Iraq the Coalition Provisional Authority created an Iraqi 
Governing Council as early as July 2003, and by September this had established a new Ministry of 
Environment under the responsibility of a Cabinet-level Minister. As noted by a UN Post-Conflict 
Assessment Team, the new ministry inherited most of the staff and organizational structure of the 
previous Environmental Protection and Improvement Directorate. The rationale was to maintain the 
acknowledged expertise and effective decentralization of Iraqi environmental governance, although 
the new ministry was judged to require substantial international assistance to cope with the scale of 
post-conflict environmental damage (UNEP/DEP 2003). What was not foreseen in 2003 was that 
the severe security situation in Iraq would for years inhibit capacity-building of environmental 
institutions. 
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In the occupied Palestinian territory, delegation of various environmental governance functions is 
enabled by the Oslo Accords, agreed in 1993 (Oslo I) and 1995 (Oslo II) between Israel and 
Palestinian political representatives. The Accords, which were planned to be interim self-
government arrangements until a permanent peace settlement, allowed the creation of the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as an autonomous political entity. In 2000 the PNA created a 
Ministry of Environmental Affairs (subsequently renamed the Environmental Quality Authority) to 
oversee the development of environmental policy in the West Bank and Gaza. With assistance from 
international donors, the Environmental Quality Authority has developed professional expertise and 
regulatory competence relating to natural resources, pollution, biodiversity, land degradation and 
cultural heritage. Other PNA entities – notably the Palestinian Water Authority and Ministry of 
Agriculture – also have environmental management responsibilities, and cooperate with the 
environmental authority. While the Oslo Accords facilitated the development of environmental 
governance in the oPt, this capacity is nevertheless significantly compromised by the Israeli 
occupation. For example, Israel remains responsible for civil affairs and security in 60% of the 
West Bank (Area C) and, even outside Area C, movement and access restrictions weaken the 
exercise of Palestinian regulatory powers. As already noted, Israel also retains control of shared 
Palestinian-Israeli water resources, which, according to recent independent reviews (Amnesty 
International 2009; World Bank 2009), are neither equitably allocated nor sustainably managed. 
 
The environmental policy responsibilities of an occupying power come under its humanitarian 
obligations to take care of the civilian population and to undertake responsible management of 
natural resources. It remains an open question as to how far an occupying power should facilitate, 
or allow, improvements in environmental governance capacity that exceed those present in the 
country prior to occupation. In the scholarship on international humanitarian law, there is a 
recognition that occupying powers may be justified, under human rights considerations, in altering 
the constitutional and legal order governing the subject population – what Roberts (2006) labels 
‘transformative military occupation’: the introduction of a democratic constitution to Iraq is one 
such example, which is potentially positive in terms of respect for human rights. If democratic 
governance becomes a legitimate expectation in the movement away from occupation, it can 
plausibly be argued that occupying powers should promote environmental management institutions 
compatible with a democratic political culture. Similarly, the idea that an occupied territory may 
one day rejoin the international community as a sovereign state generates also the expectation that 
its environmental management targets are compatible with widely shared norms of environmental 
law. 
 
 
4.0 Research and policy implications 
 
There is a modest but growing body of research on the environmental effects of occupations. While 
attention has typically been drawn to the environmental effects arising from the high-intensity 
conflict that precedes or interrupts a belligerent occupation, there is increasing recognition of the 
direct and indirect environmental changes caused by occupation practices themselves. The 
pervasiveness and often diffuse character of these effects – which may be unintended in terms of 
the goals of the occupying power – can escape the attention of those tracking more visible 
disruptions to the physical environment. It is here that warfare ecology can make a significant 
contribution both to the development of research on the effects of occupations and also to policy 
considerations for reducing these effects. 
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4.1 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
 
In their manifesto for warfare ecology, Machlis and Hanson (2008) identify the need for research 
which considers the environmental effects of more than one stage of warfare, as well as the 
cumulative and cascading effects of particular actions. They recommend the development and 
testing of conceptual frameworks which are capable of capturing the trajectories of these changes 
through coupled biophysical and socioeconomic systems. It is not surprising, therefore, that systems 
theory lends itself to warfare ecology and that any such systemic explanation needs to be able to 
accommodate interdisciplinary inputs. As with the ecological study of other stages of warfare, the 
analysis of occupation practices could productively be undertaken both by extensive comparative 
surveys and intensive case studies. However, the findings should be integrated into the systemic 
explanatory frameworks of warfare ecology. 
 
At the same time, environmental research on belligerent occupations can add distinctive analytical 
components to warfare ecology. In the first place, the interests of the occupying power/people in 
recovery and reconstruction suggest the opportunity for post-war insights on the long-term effects 
from contemporary armed conflict. Such insights are necessary for the occupying power to 
undertake effective administration and meet its international humanitarian obligations. Section 3.1 
above summarized some of the key ecological effects encountered in practice during the 
occupations of Iraq and the Palestinian territory. Warfare ecology can provide a fertile theoretical 
framework for categorizing and assessing the various consequences across different spatio-temporal 
scales. It can also suggest hypotheses for advancing understanding of the socio-ecological processes 
that determine which effects are more significant and why. 
 
Secondly, warfare ecology can illuminate the inter-linkages between, on the one hand, the impacts 
of intense conflict and, on the other, the direct and indirect environmental effects of occupation 
practices. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 outlined a diverse range of direct and indirect effects as encountered, 
again, in Iraq and the occupied Palestinian territory. These environmental effects of occupation 
practices are under-theorized, in past because of the lack of systematic ecological research on this 
stage of warfare. The nature of occupation practice, which imposes enduring stresses on the 
affected civilian population, suggests that vulnerability analysis could offer valuable insights here 
as part of a warfare ecology approach. Broad-based vulnerability perspectives are most appropriate 
(e.g. Turner et al. 2003; Adger 2006) as they encompass the role of socio-economic and political 
pressures on individuals and groups who are also facing war-related environmental effects. 
Vulnerability analysis is also in tune with the openness of warfare ecology to the multi-scalar 
operation of human-biophysical processes; for example, how an occupied population may be 
vulnerable to events outside the control of an occupying power, such as the impacts of climate 
change and variations in world food prices. 
 
To advance such an understanding, there is a need, thirdly, for the formulation and use of 
standardized methodologies. There are already examples of best practice to draw upon in order to 
guide warfare ecological analyses of occupations. The environmental assessment methodology 
developed by UNEP is arguably the most mature and scientifically robust: UNEP now has over a 
decade of experience conducting post-conflict environmental assessments (PCEAs), and these 
studies demonstrate the importance of context-sensitive data gathering and analysis. As noted above 
in Section 3.0, the diverse methods employed in practice have included background research, 
remote sensing, fieldwork and laboratory analysis. Of course, PCEAs are usually conducted in a 
reactive fashion, with a methodological focus on sites severely damaged by conflict rather than 
occupation practices, although there are exceptions – for example, the environmental desk study of 
the occupied Palestinian territory (UNEP 2003a). Warfare ecology can make an significant 
scholarly contribution by considering the wider ecosystem context of post-conflict environmental 
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effects. Indeed, its holistic perspective could assist PCEA practitioners in considering longer-term 
environmental vulnerabilities. 
 
 
4.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
There are also policy implications that arise from the application of warfare ecology to the study of 
belligerent occupations. Needless to say, these implications include adding occupation-specific 
insights to the policy outcomes suggested by Machlis and Hanson for warfare ecology more 
generally (2008: 733-734). Thus, ecological research on occupations may assist military planners in 
preventing or mitigating the long-term ecological and humanitarian impacts of warfare. Such 
research may also facilitate a more effective recovery of those ecosystem services essential to 
meeting the basic needs of a vulnerable population in an occupation, e.g. water, food and fuel 
security. Insofar as an occupying power seeks to cooperate with humanitarian agencies, warfare 
ecology could facilitate an agreed methodological framework for assessing environmental effects. 
Warfare ecology could, in addition, provide insights on the restoration of natural resource-
dependent economic sectors, with a view to supporting sustainable livelihoods and other human 
development goals for occupied populations. Indeed, UNEP (2009b) has recently recommended 
widening the environmental scope of post-conflict needs assessments to include longer-term 
environmental trends in relation to sustainable natural resource use. 
 
Whether or not an occupation is belligerent, the protection of environmental resources has become a 
legitimate responsibility for military or civilian forces governing in post-conflict territories. 
However, the coercive character of belligerent occupation is a distinctive policy challenge, as the 
legal obligation on an occupying power to undertake effective administration conflicts with the 
notion that the affected population has the right to full democratic governance – at least as long as 
the occupation lasts. As noted above (Section 3.4), it remains an open question under humanitarian 
law as to how much an occupying power is obliged to facilitate or promote the environmental 
governance capacity of domestic institutions under its effective control. In the occupied Palestinian 
territory, for example, limits imposed by Israel on the regulatory authority and scope of Palestinian 
institutions have impeded the implementation of environmental policy. In Iraq under the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, efforts to build effective environmental institutions were undermined by 
continuing lawlessness and violent resistance. 
 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 
Belligerent occupations are part of the conflict continuum covered by warfare ecology. They are 
also covered by a distinctive subset of international humanitarian law (jus in bello) – the legal 
norms governing the conduct of war. Existing humanitarian law includes provisions that prohibit 
unnecessary environmental damage, yet their application during periods of occupation is uncertain, 
relating largely to the control of civilian resources and infrastructure by the occupying power. The 
legal norms governing occupation are also hampered by the absence of an international enforcement 
agency: at best, these norms are selectively enforced by relevant states and international 
organizations. This chapter examined the potential role of warfare ecology in accounting for the 
environmental effects of belligerent occupations, highlighting the multiple, often indirect, means by 
which such occupations affect ecological processes. Substantive examples were drawn from the 
occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel and the occupation of Iraq by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority.  
 
It was argued that warfare ecology can make a major contribution to assessing the effects of 
occupations and, through the generation of policy advice, to promote means for reducing negative 
 14 
ecological consequences. Nevertheless, there remains unresolved the question as to the nature and 
scope of environmental protection duties borne by an occupying power under international 
humanitarian law. On the one hand, these seem largely indirect: in its overriding responsibility to 
meet the needs of the civilian population, the occupying power is obliged at best to exercise the 
guardianship of natural resources under its control. On the other, this role of ‘temporary trusteeship’ 
indicates that the occupied population actually retains permanent sovereignty over these resources 
and associated ecosystem services. If the latter is the case, then warfare ecology has a vital role to 
play in showing how the environmental responsibility of an occupying power is much more than the 
prevention or mitigation of particular impacts arising from its military activities. Indeed, it implies 
that the occupying power must strive to ensure that the occupied population is also protected from 
other sources of significant environmental harm. 
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